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Aspect-oriented programming introduces new challenges for software testing. Inparticular the pointcut descriptor (PCD) requires particular attention fromtesters. The PCD describes the set of joinpoints where the advices are woven.In this paper we present a tool, AjMutator, for the mutation analysis of PCDs.AjMutator implements several mutation operators that introduce faults in thePCDs to generate a set of mutants. AjMutator classifies the mutants accordingto the set of joinpoints they match compared to the set of joinpoints matchedby the initial PCD. An interesting result is that this automaticclassification can identify equivalent mutants for a particular class of PCDs.AjMutator can also run a set of test cases on the mutants to give a mutationscore. We have applied AjMutator on two systems to show that this tool issuitable for the mutation analysis of PCDs on large AspectJ systems.

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We present a model-based approach to testing access control requirements. By using combinatorial testing, we first automatically generate test cases from and without access control policies—i.e., the model—and assess the effectiveness of the test suites by means of mutation testing. We also compare them to purely random tests. For some of the investigated strategies, non-random tests kill considerably more mutants thanthe same number of random tests. Since we rely on policies only, no information on the application is required at this stage. As a consequence, our methodology applies to arbitrary implementations of the policy decision points.

We present a model-based approach to testing access control requirements. By using combinatorial testing, we first automatically generate test cases from and without access control policies—i.e., the model—and assess the effectiveness of the test suites by means of mutation testing. We also compare them to purely random tests. For some of the investigated strategies, non-random tests kill considerably more mutants thanthe same number of random tests. Since we rely on policies only, no information on the application is required at this stage. As a consequence, our methodology applies to arbitrary implementations of the policy decision points.

We present a model-based approach to testing access control requirements. By using combinatorial testing, we first automatically generate test cases from and without access control policies—i.e., the model—and assess the effectiveness of the test suites by means of mutation testing. We also compare them to purely random tests. For some of the investigated strategies, non-random tests kill considerably more mutants thanthe same number of random tests. Since we rely on policies only, no information on the application is required at this stage. As a consequence, our methodology applies to arbitrary implementations of the policy decision points.

We present a model-based approach to testing access control requirements. By using combinatorial testing, we first automatically generate test cases from and without access control policies—i.e., the model—and assess the effectiveness of the test suites by means of mutation testing. We also compare them to purely random tests. For some of the investigated strategies, non-random tests kill considerably more mutants thanthe same number of random tests. Since we rely on policies only, no information on the application is required at this stage. As a consequence, our methodology applies to arbitrary implementations of the policy decision points.

While important efforts are dedicated to system functional testing, very few works study how to test specifically security mechanisms, implementing a security policy. This paper introduces security policy testing as a specific target for testing. We propose two strategies for producing security policy test cases, depending if they are built in complement of existing functional test cases or independently from them. Indeed, any security policy is strongly connected to system functionality: testing functions includes exercising many security mechanisms. However, testing functionality does not intend at putting to the test security aspects. We thus propose test selection criteria to produce tests from a security policy. To quantify the effectiveness of a set of test cases to detect security policy flaws, we adapt mutation analysis and define security policy mutation operators. A library case study, a 3-tiers architecture, is used to obtain experimental trends. Results confirm that security must become a specific target of testing to reach a satisfying level of confidence in security mechanisms.

In this paper, we study how mutation analysis can be adapted to qualify test cases aiming at testing a security policy. The objective is to make test cases efficient to reveal erroneous implementations of a security policy. The notion of security policy testing is studied and mutation operators are defined in relation with the security rules. To make the approach applicable in practice we discuss and empirically rank the security mutation operators from the most to the least difficult to kill. The empirical study is a library software, which is implemented with a typical 3-tier architecture.

The need for testing-for-diagnosis strategies has been identified for a long time, but the explicit link from testing to diagnosis (fault localization) is rare. Analyzing the type of information needed for efficient fault localization, we identify the attribute (called Dynamic Basic Block) that restricts the accuracy of a diagnosis algorithm. Based on this attribute, a test-for-diagnosis criterion is proposed and validated through rigorous case studies: it shows that a test suite can be improved to reach a high level of diagnosis accuracy. So, the dilemma between a reduced testing effort (with as few test cases as possible) and the diagnosis accuracy (that needs as much test cases as possible to get more information) is partly solved by selecting test cases that are dedicated to diagnosis.

In MDE, model transformations should be efficiently tested so that it may be used and reused safely. Mutation analysis is an efficient technique to evaluate the quality of test data, and has been extensively studied both for procedural and object-oriented languages. In this paper, we study how it can be adapted to model oriented programming. Since no model transformation language has been widely accepted today, we propose generic fault models that are related to the model transformation process. First, we identify abstract operations that constitute this process: model navigation, model’s elements filtering, output model creation and input model modification. Then, we propose a set of specific mutation operators which are directly inspired from these operations. We believe that these operators are meaningful since a large part of the errors in a transformation are due to the manipulation of complex models regardless of the concrete implementation language.

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The level of confidence in a software component is often linked to the quality of its test cases. This quality can in turn be evaluated with mutation analysis: faults are injected into the software component (making mutants of it) to check the proportion of mutants detected (‘killed’) by the test cases. But while the generation of a set of basic test cases is easy, improving its quality may require prohibitive effort. This paper focuses on the issue of automating the test optimization. The application of genetic algorithms would appear to be an interesting way of tackling it. The optimization problem is modelled as follows: a test case can be considered as a predator while a mutant program is analogous to a prey. The aim of the selection process is to generate test cases able to kill as many mutants as possible, starting from an initial set of predators, which is the test cases set provided by the programmer. To overcome disappointing experimentation results, on .Net components and unit Eiffel classes, a slight variation on this idea is studied, no longer at the ‘animal’ level (lions killing zebras, say) but at the bacteriological level. The bacteriological level indeed better reflects the test case optimization issue: it mainly differs from the genetic one by the introduction of a memorization function and the suppression of the crossover operator. The purpose of this paper is to explain how the genetic algorithms have been adapted to fit with the issue of test optimization. The resulting algorithm differs so much from genetic algorithms that it has been given another name: bacteriological algorithm.

Improving test cases automatically is a nonlinear optimization problem. To solve this problem, we've developed a bacteriologic algorithm, adapted from genetic algorithms that can generate and optimize a set of test cases. A .NET component that parses C# source files illustrates our algorithm.

In this paper, we present several complementary computational intelligence techniques that we explored in the field of .Net component testing. Mutation testing serves as the common backbone for applying classical and new artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. With mutation tools, we know how to estimate the revealing power of test cases. With AI, we aim at automatically improving test case efficiency. We therefore looked first at genetic algorithms (GA) to solve the problem of test. The aim of the selection process is to generate test cases able to kill as many mutants as possible. We then propose a new AI algorithm that fits better to the test optimization problem, called bacteriological algorithm (BA): BAs behave better that GAs for this problem. However, between GAs and BAs, a family of intermediate algorithms exists: we explore the whole spectrum of these intermediate algorithms to determine whether an algorithm exists that would be more efficient than BAs.: the approaches are compared on a .Net system.

The level of confidence in a software component is often linked to the quality of its test cases. This quality can in turn be evaluated with mutation analysis: faulty components (mutants) are systematically generated to check the proportion of mutants detected ("killed") by the test cases. But while the generation of basic test cases set is easy, improving its quality may require prohibitive effort. This paper focuses on the issue of automating the test optimization. We looked at genetic algorithms to solve this problem and modeled it as follows: a test case can be considered as a predator while a mutant program is analogous to a prey. The aim of the selection process is to generate test cases able to kill as many mutants as possible. To overcome disappointing experimentation results on the studied .Net system, we propose a slight variation on this idea, no longer at the "animal" level (lions killing zebras) but at the bacteriological level. The bacteriological level indeed better reflects the test case optimization issue: it introduces of a memorization function and the suppresses the crossover operator. We describe this model and show how it behaves on the case study.

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